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Although digitalization and the emergence of the Internet has caused a long-term
crisis  for  copyright  law,  technology  itself  also  seems  to offer  a seemingly  ideal
solution to the challenges of digital  age:  copyright has  been a major  use case  for
algorithmic  enforcement  from  the early  days  of digital  rights  management
technologies  to the more  advanced  content  recognition  algorithms.  These
technologies  identify  and  filter  possibly  infringing  content  automatically,
effectively and often in a preventive fashion. These methods have been criticized for
their  shortcomings,  such  as the lack  of transparency,  bias  and  the possible
impairment of fundamental  rights.  Self-learning machines and semi-autonomous
AI have the potential to offer even more sophisticated and expeditious enforcement
by code, however, they could also aggravate the aforementioned issues. As the EU
legislator envisions to make the use of such technologies essentially obligatory for
certain  online  content  sharing  service  providers  (via the infamous  Article 17
of the directive  on copyright  in the digital  single  market),  the assessment
of the situation in light of future technological development has become a current
topic.
This  paper  aims  to identify  the main  issues  and  potential  long-term
consequences  of creating  legislation  that  practically  requires  the employment
of such  filtering  algorithms  as well  as their  solutions.  This  paper  focuses
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on the potential  role a broad copyright exception for text and data mining could
play in counterbalancing the issues associated with algorithmic enforcement. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: COPYRIGHT, EXCEPTIONS AND 
TECHNOLOGY
The purpose  and  aim  of copyright  law  has  traditionally  been  described
along  two  major  theoretical  views:  according  to the utilitarian  approach,
copyright’s  goal  is  to promote  the advancement  of learning  and  culture
by providing  certain  exclusive  rights  to authors  and  creators  in order
to stimulate the production and dissemination of intellectual works, while
the natural  rights-based  justification  argues  that  the relevant  rights  need
to be  afforded  to authors  and  creators  as a reward  for  their  intellectual
labour, as well as a protection of their personality enshrined in their works.1
Even though the two main copyright law regimes, the common law based
“copyright”  system  and  the droit  d’auteur (authors’  rights)  approach
prevalent  in continental  Europe  formulate  and  emphasize  these  ideas
differently,2 the underlying  concept  is  similar  in each  jurisdiction.  From
an economic aspect,  these exclusive rights (such as: right of reproduction,
right  of distribution,  public  performance,  creation  of derivative  works)
incentivize and reward the intellectual labour of copyright holders (who are
usually  the authors  of the work),  by giving  them  the sole  authority
to license  and  authorize  the use  and  exploitation  of their  copyright-
-protected works to third parties.
However, this power does not create an absolute monopoly for the right
holder:  for  the sake  of long-term  development,  and  in order  to make
1 Fisher, W. W. (2001) Theories of Intellectual Property. In: Stephen Munzer (ed.). New Essays
in the Legal and Political Theory of Property. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
pp. 169–171.
2 Although the most obvious example of the embodiment of this idea is Article I. Section 8.
Clause  8.  of the United  States’  Constitution,  it  also  appears  in Recitals  (2),  (4)  and  (10)
of the most  important  European  copyright  directive,  the InfoSoc  Directive  (Directive
2001/29/EC  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 22  May  2001
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights  in the information
society.  Official  Journal  of the European  Union  (2001/L-167/10)  22  June.  Available  from:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001L0029&from=EN
[Accessed 10 January 2019]) as well as in the recital of the Hungarian Copyright Act, thus
this concept is also deeply embedded in the continental “authors’ rights” regimes.
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the knowledge  incorporated  in copyright-protected  works  more  easily
accessible, some limitations on these exclusive rights have been put in place.
One  way  to limit  copyright  is  by introducing  different  exceptions3
by declaring that certain specific uses that do not conflict with the normal
exploitation  of works  and  do  not  unreasonably  prejudice  the legitimate
interests of the right holder4 do not necessitate prior authorization and/or
payment  of royalties.  These  uses  are  excepted  for  different  reasons,  for
instance  due  to their  de minimis impact  on right  holders’  rights
(e.g. temporary  acts  of reproduction)  or their  socially  beneficial  nature
(e.g. teaching illustration, criticism).5 At the same time, however, exceptions
also  serve  as an important  tool  for  balancing  between  the legitimate
economic interests of copyright holders and the fundamental rights (most
importantly the freedom of expression and information) of users.
Another  important  feature  of copyright  law  for  the purposes  of this
paper is its connection to technology and the way the development of this
specific field of law and the advancement of technology have always been
closely intertwined: the appearance of the movable type and printing press
and  their  contribution  to the technology  of dissemination  of information
proved  to be  a disruptive  technology  and  resulted  in the need  for
3 Even  though  there  is  no  opportunity  to explore  the topic  in detail  in this  paper,
the distinction  between  the Anglo-American  style  of fair  use or fair  dealing system  and
the exhaustive  list  of exceptions  found  in continental  European  droit  d’auteur regimes
should  be  mentioned  in relation  to the subject  of copyright  limitations  and  exceptions.
The former, more flexible scheme relies on the judicial interpretation of certain standards.
Judges  evaluate  the following  four  factors  in relation  to the allegedly  infringing  use:
(1) the purpose  and  character  of the use,  including  whether  such  use  is  of a commercial
nature  or  is  for  nonprofit  educational  purposes;  (2) the nature  of the copyrighted  work;
(3) the amount  and substantiality  of the portion  used  in relation  to the copyrighted work
as a whole;  and  (4) the effect  of the use  upon  the potential  market  for  or value
of the copyrighted  work  (Sec. 107,  Copyright  Act  of 1976).  In contrast,  the continental
European  system  accommodates  clearly  and  narrowly  defined  exceptions  implemented
by way of legislation (see also InfoSoc Directive, Article 5). For more on the American style
fair  use  see:  Leval,  P.  N.  (1990)  Toward a Fair  Use Standard.  Harvard  Law Review, 103,
p. 1105;  Fisher,  W. W. (1988)  Reconstructing the Fair  Use Doctrine.  Harvard Law Review,
101 (8),  p. 1659; Thatcher, S. G. (2006) Fair  Use in Theory and Practice: Reflections on its
History and the Google Case. Journal of Scholarly Publishing, 37 (3), pp. 215–229; Richard, K.
(2018)  Fair  Use  in the Information  Age.  Richmond  Journal  of Law  & Technology, 25 (1);
or the U.S.  Copyright  Office’s  information.  United  States  Copyright  Office.  (2019)  More
information  on fair  use. [online]  Washington,  D. C.:  USCO.  Available  from:  https://www.
copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html [Accessed 23 May 2019].
4 This set of requirements is known as the “three step test” and it ensures that exceptions
would  not  truncate  copyright  protection  to an unjustified  extent.  The test  first  appeared
in Article 9 of the Berne Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the concept
later  became  also  enshrined  in Article 13  of the Agreement  on Trade-Related  Aspects
of Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPS),  as well  as Article 5  paragraph  (5)  of the InfoSoc
Directive.
5 Stamatoudi,  I.  and  Torremans,  P.  (2014)  EU  Copyright  Law,  a Commentary. 1st  ed.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 441.
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an exclusive right for publishers in order to secure their business. This later
developed  into  an exclusive  right  for  the authors  of works,6 and  led
to the appearance  of copyright  as a distinct  field  of law.7 Throughout  its
history,  technology and new technological  inventions  have had the most
relevant impact on copyright’s evolution: new inventions, such as the Xerox
machine, the audio cassette or the VCR not only accommodated new forms
of uses, but also upset the above-mentioned balance between the interests
of right  holders and users.8 The most  dramatic  change and challenge for
copyright  law  so  far  has  proved  to be  digitalization  and  the emergence
of the Internet.  In this  new,  digital  environment  the costs  of copying  and
sharing  information  and  copyright-protected  content  converge  towards
zero,  which  fosters  unauthorized  mass  production  and distribution,  and
thus  mass  infringement.9 As digital  uses  of copyright-protected  works
usually  occur  in a cross-border  manner  (given  the globalized  nature
of the Internet)  and  under  anonymity  ensured  by the World  Wide  Web,
the proper  enforcement  of exclusive  rights  became  exponentially  more
difficult for right holders. Many scholars, commentators, policymakers and
legislators sought to find a solution to this “crisis” situation, by legislative
or extra-legislative  means,  however,  these  efforts  did  not  always  bring
the desired  results.10 Concerning  law making,  as the legislative  process  is
and will always be slower than technological development, the application
and  interpretation  of existing  laws  to new  technologies  and  solutions
constitutes  another  problem  in the context  of technological  neutrality.
Though this overarching principle of lawmaking aims to ensure that legal
provisions are constructed in a way that is independent from any particular
6 The first  copyright  act,  the Statute  of Anne  was  adopted in 1710  in Great  Britain  and it
deviated  from  the earlier  legislation  that  gave  publishing  monopoly  to the Stationer’s
Company  (an exclusive  group  of printers  and  booksellers)  and  it  vested  the rights  and
protection in the authors themselves. See: Joyce, C. (ed.). (2013) Copyright Law. 9th ed. New
Providence: LexisNexis, pp. 17–19.
7 Joyce, C. (ed.). (2013) Op. cit., p. 16.
8 Latman, A. and Patry, W. F. (1986)  Latman’s the Copyright Law. 6th ed. Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of National Affairs.
9 Joyce, C. (ed.). (2013) Op. cit., pp. 45–47.
10 For more on this, see: Mills, M. L. (1989) New Technology and the Limitations of Copyright
Law:  An Argument  for  Finding Alternatives  to Copyright  Legislation  in an Era  of Rapid
Technological  Change.  Chicago-Kent  Law  Review, 65 (1);  Geller,  P.  E.  (2008)  Beyond
the Copyright Crisis:  Principles  for Change.  Journal  of the Copyright Society of the USA, 55,
pp. 165–199; Litman, J. (2002) Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age. In: Adam
Thierer  and  Wayne  Crews  (eds.).  Copy  Fights:  The Future  of Intellectual  Property
in the Information Age. 1st ed. Washington, D. C.: Cato Institute.
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technology without any negative or positive discrimination,11 the different
approaches towards its conceptualization can lead to very different results.12
Thus,  even the more flexible  and reactive  jurisprudence  and case  law is
unable  to guarantee  an adequate,  appropriate  and  uniform  answer
to the questions  of copyright  law  brought  about  by emerging  new
technologies.
2. ALGORITHMIC COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT AND 
ITS EVOLUTION
The so-called  algorithmic  enforcement  of copyright  appeared  in light
of the aforementioned  problem  triggered  by digitalization  and  the spread
of the Internet. As it became clear that the traditional ways of enforcement
were inefficient  and costly (individual  users behind online  infringements
became extremely difficult to track down and identify and they are typically
judgement-proof  against  large  sums  of damages),  the idea  of using
technology  itself  to solve  the issues  brought  about  by technology
appeared,13 and  the concept  of controlling  digital  uses  by digital  means
came to light.
In copyright,  the first  generation  of algorithmic  enforcement  tools
comprised  of the so-called  technological  protection  measures  (TPM) [also
known  as digital  rights  management,  or DRM  technologies  in the United
States],  which  operated  as digital  locks:  right  holders  could  technically
prevent unauthorized access to and control the subsequent use of the digital
formats  of their  works,  by way  of encryption.14 This  provided  a well-
-functioning technology for right holders, and ensured that users could only
gain access to legally acquired works; the option to make digital copies was
either  completely disabled  or limited to a small  number of copies  or even
11 Greenberg, B. A. (2016) Rethinking Technology Neutrality.  Minnesota Law Review, 100 (4),
p. 1513.
12 A more  restrictive  understanding  of technological  neutrality  could  result  in the rigid
application  of old  law  to new  technology  regardless  of its  potential  impact
on the development of said technology, while the more laxed views also consider achieving
equivalent  outcomes  and maintaining the purpose of copyright  law itself.  This  can  lead
to opposing results when assessing whether an act is copyright-relevant or not. See: Craig,
C.  J.  (2017)  Technological  Neutrality:  Recalibrating  Copyright  in the Information  Age.
Theoretical Issues in Law, 17 (2), pp. 608–615.
13 About  the idea  that  “code  is  law”  and  the role  of technology  as a means  for  indirect
regulation, see: Lessig, L. (2006) Code v. 2.0. [online] New York: Basic Books. Available from:
http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf [Accessed 10 January 2019].
14 Perel, M. and Elkin-Koren, N. (2016) Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement.
Stanford Technology Law Review, 19 (3), p. 484.
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a restriction  regarding  the type  and  number  of the devices  used  for
the enjoyment  of the works  could  be  applied.15 The most  known
applications  of this  technology  were  CSS  (Content  Scrambling  System),
Apple’s  Fair  Play or Adobe’s  DRM.  These  technologies  suffered  from
a number of shortcomings: as they were easily hacked, an additional legal
protection (in the form of the prohibition of the circumvention of TPM) was
needed. In addition, even the introduction of such provisions could not help
to remedy other problems, such as TPMs causing security risks and slowing
down computers, limiting consumers’ ability to enjoy their legally bought
products by only letting them to access their content on a limited number
of devices  or generally  overriding  copyright  exceptions  by being  overly
preventive by design.16 Although some technological tools to accommodate
exceptions existed at the time (such as interoperability, the partitioning and
authentication  of users),  they  were  not  and  could  not  be  employed
by the majority of TPM technologies.17
With  the spread of social  media  and the emergence  of platforms  such
as Facebook,  YouTube,  or Instagram  as well  as the proliferation  of user-
-generated content that these new platforms enabled, the second generation
of algorithmic enforcement technologies appeared. The main focus of these
new tools  became the online  availability  of copyright  protected content.18
Facebook’s  Rights  Manager19 or YouTube’s  Content  ID20 offer  right  holders
a nuanced  approach  to digital  copyright  management.  The best  way
to illustrate  the functioning  of such  systems  is  through  the example
of YouTube’s ContentID algorithm. Through this mechanism, right holders
provide to YouTube information and data about their works that they do not
wish  to see  unauthorized  copies  of on the video-sharing  platform.  Based
on these  data  a digital  fingerprint  for  that  specific  piece  of content  is
generated.  Each  time  a new video is  uploaded to YouTube,  the algorithm
15 Kerr,  I.  (2010)  Digital  Locks  and  the Automation  Virtue.  In:  Michael  Geist  (ed.).  From
„Radical  Extremism”  to „Balanced  Copyright”:  Canadian  Copyright  and  the Digital  Agenda.
1st ed. Toronto: Irwin Law, p. 267.
16 Myška, M. (2009) The True Story of DRM. Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology,
3 (2), pp. 272–277.
17 Akester,  P. (2009)  Technological Accomodation of Conflicts between Freedom of Expression and
DRM:  The First  Empirical  Assessment. Rochester,  New  York:  Social  Science  Research
Network, p. 103.
18 Perel, M. and Elkin-Koren, N. (2016) Op. cit., pp. 478–481.
19 Facebook.  (2019)  Rights  Manager.  [online]  Available  from:  https://rightsmanager.fb.com/
[Accessed 10 January 2019].
20 YouTube.  (2019)  Copyright  Management  Tools –  Content  ID. [online]  Available  from:
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/9245819 [Accessed 10 January 2019].
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checks  whether  there  are  any  matches  between  any  of the fingerprints
in the library  and the video in question.  In the event  of a newly uploaded
video matching a fingerprint,  it  becomes flagged as potentially  infringing
content.  As a consequence,  the right  holder  has  a few  options  to choose
from: they can follow the viewership statistics of the flagged video,  block
access  to it,  or they  can  also  claim  all  advertising  revenues  in case
the allegedly  infringing  video  is  monetized.21 According  to YouTube’s
statistics,  ContentID is  used  by more  than  9,000  partners,  including
television broadcast companies, movie studios as well as record companies,
while  the reference  library  contains  more  than  75  million  digital
fingerprints.22 Nevertheless,  it  also  means  that  the main  beneficiaries
of the ContentID mechanism  are  high-profile  entertainment  companies
whose  protected  works  are  used  in large  numbers.  As the employment
of this  technology  necessitates  the ownership  of a significant  amount
of copyright-protected  content,  the submission  of a high  number  of valid
takedown requests  and the resources  to manage them,  ContentID  and its
options mentioned above are mostly available for large and economically
significant right holders.23 Smaller companies owning copyright-protected
content can benefit from the Content Verification Tool, which only makes it
possible  for  the right  holders  to search  for  and  request  the removal
of potentially  infringing  videos.24 Creators  of smaller  scale  (typically
the authors of user-generated content) are offered the Copyright Match Tool,
which  scans  the platform  for  unauthorized  uploads  of original  videos.
However,  in case  of matching  content,  the authors  are  only  offered more
limited  options:  they  can  email  the uploader,  request  the immediate
removal  of the matched  content,  request  a scheduled  removal  or archive
the match without taking any action.25 Thus, it is clear that the biggest actors
in the industry dispose of the widest array of possibilities and most effective
tools for enforcement, while smaller entities and creators of original content
(who  constitute  the basis  of YouTube’s functioning  and philosophy)  have
21 YouTube. (2019) How Content ID works. [online] Available from: https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en&ref_topic=2778544 [Accessed 10 January 2019].
22 YouTube. (2019)  YouTube in Numbers. [online]  Available from:   https://www.youtube.com/
yt/about/press/ [Accessed 14 June 2019].
23 YouTube.  (2019)  Copyright  Management  Tools. [online]  Available  from:  https://support.
google.com/youtube/answer/9245819?hl=en [Accessed 14 June 2019].
24 YouTube.  (2019)  Content  Verification  Program.  [online]  Available  from:  https://support.
google.com/youtube/answer/6005923 [Accessed 14 June 2019].
25 YouTube. (2019) Copyright Match Tool.  [online] Available from: https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/7648743 [Accessed 14 June 2019].
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more  constrained  options  to enforce  their  rights.  The most  striking
difference is  the lack of the option for monetization,  the potential  to claim
the advertising revenues off the potentially infringing videos.
Even  more  so  that  this  latter  option  is  what  provides  the apparent
benefit  of the second  generation  systems:  contrary  to the first  generation
of enforcement  technologies,  they  enable  an ex  post  facto licensing
mechanism through the possibility of claiming ad-revenues.26 However, this
solution is  not  completely in line  with  copyright  law’s  concept:  no  prior
authorization  is  granted  as the collection  of revenues  takes  place  after
the actual use has already happened; there is no direct agreement between
the right holder and the user, thus there is no enforceable contract in place
for  the purpose  of using  the protected  work.  The punitive  nature
of the redirecting  of revenues  is  also  foreign  in the licensing  practice.
At the same  time,  the content  of the videos  at least  remain  accessible
to the public.  This  scheme  accommodates  freedom  of expression  and
information  better,  as the default  option  is  not  to completely  block
the potentially  infringing  content,  but  to keep  it  accessible  in order
to generate  revenue  for  the right  holder.  At first  glance,  this  mechanism
seems  to offer  a near  to ideal  solution  to the digital  copyright  law  crisis:
videos  can  still  be  watched  by the passive,  consumer  public,  while  right
holders  receive  income  after  the use  of their  works.  Nevertheless,
the uncertainty  about  the type  of content  that  can  actually  trigger
the algorithm  and  would  be  flagged  and  qualified  as infringing  carries
the potential  to create  a discouraging  environment  for  active  users
(especially  those  producing  user-generated  content),  resulting  in self-
-censorship. 
3. THE POTENTIAL ISSUES OF ALGORITHMIC 
COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT
Even though the technologies introduced in the previous chapter cater for
an effective  and  seemingly  well-functioning  enforcement  of digital
copyright,  the potential  drawbacks  of and  issues  caused  by these
algorithmic measures need to be considered and evaluated as well.
One  of the main  problems  derives  from  the fact  that  codes  and
algorithms  used  as the basis  of these  technologies  are  mostly  treated
26 Perel, M. and Elkin-Koren, N. (2016) Op. cit., p. 512–513.
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as trade secrets and as such are kept hidden from the public eye in order
to secure competitive advantage as well as to prevent users from “playing
the system”  by exploiting  loopholes  in the functioning  of the algorithms.
The resulting  non-transparency  can  lead  to overprotection  and  abuse
of power through a lack of accountability.27 As a consequence,  individuals
with the intent to legitimately use these platforms are unable to adjust their
behaviour  to be  compliant  due  to their  unawareness  of the boundaries
of the  rules  implied  by technology.  The uncertainty  about  the type
of content that can actually trigger the algorithm and would be flagged and
qualified  as infringing  carries  the potential  to create  a discouraging
environment  for  active  users,  especially  those  producing  user-generated
content  and  resulting  in self-censorship.  Given  that  social  media  and
content  sharing  platforms  were  specifically  built  on the idea  of users
creating and sharing their own original content, this issue goes to the core
of the functioning of these service providers.
The second identified issue is that right holders can effectively disable
copyright  exceptions  by exercising  excessively  strict  control  over  their
content.  The problem with  the current  content  identification  technologies
(including  YouTube’s  Content  ID)  is  that  although  they  are  capable
of filtering  out  identical  or matching  content,  they  are  not  sophisticated
enough to be able to distinguish infringing use from uses that fall under one
of the categories of exceptions.28 Thus, even excepted uses could be flagged
and blocked from public availability. An illustrative example is of a review
video about a newly released movie:  in order  to get  the point  across  and
to give a foundation to their arguments, the reviewer has the option to use
some footage from the movie, which (also considering the extent of the use)
could  easily  qualify  as a copyright  exception  as comment  or criticism.29
Whether  inside  or outside  of the realm  of copyright  exceptions,
disproportionality may present another issue. The terms of the after-the-fact
quasi  licence  contract  (which  essentially  bears  the characteristics
of a “compulsory licence”) embodied in the demonetization and ad-revenue
claims  could  be  highly  unfair  and  disproportionate  to the actual  use
of the protected content.30 For instance,  the use of a few seconds of a song
as background  music  in  a vlog  or a gaming  stream  could  essentially
27 Op. cit., p. 483.
28 Bartholomew, T. B. (2015) The Death of Fair Use in Cyberspace: YouTube and the Problem
with Content ID. Duke Law & Technology Review, 13 (1), p. 70.
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“hijack” the advertising revenue of videos of substantial length and views.31
Regarding the incidental inclusion exception in EU copyright law and other
jurisdictions  where  de  minimis use  falls  outside  of the scope  of copyright
protection, this issue relates back to the limitations of copyright.32
Finally, whenever legal provisions are translated into code, private and
potentially  biased  actors  analyse  and  interpret  the law.  As these  entities
determine the metes and bounds of specific  rules,  they have a substantial
potential in building bias into the code that would favour their interests and
discriminate against certain other individuals or groups.33 The most possible
form of bias in the context of enforcement algorithms is technical bias that
originates  from  trying  to make  human  constructs,  such  as a judgement
on the substance  of a legal  provision,  interpretable for  computers.34 Given
that  the interpretation  of law  is  traditionally  a public  function
29 In EU copyright law, Article 5, para. (3) d) of the InfoSoc Directive states that Member States
may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights of reproduction and communication
to the public in the case of quotations for purposes of such as criticism or review, provided
that they relate to a work or other subject matter which has already been lawfully made
available to the public, the use is in accordance with fair practice, and to the extent required
for the specific purpose. Similarly, Section 107 of the US Copyright Act (17 U.S. Code) states
that criticism and comment are of the specific purposes that might warrant fair use in light
of the evaluation  of the four  factors.  For  a specific  example,  a movie  review  about
an infamously  “bad”  movie  was  given  a copyright  strike  and  blocked  by the movie’s
director three days after its release. For the original review video see:  I Hate Everything.
(2015)  Cool  Cat  Saves  The Kids –  The Search  For  The Worst. [online video]  Available  from:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HoTZZYm2HZI&t=42s [Accessed 10 January 2019]; for
a comment on the video’s removal and fair use, see e.g.: Channel Awesome. (2016) Where‘s
The  Fair  Use –  Nostalgia  Critic. [online video]  Available  from:  https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=zVqFAMOtwaI&t=53s [Accessed 10 January 2019].
30 Bartholomew, T. B. (2015) Op. cit., p. 66.
31 One of the most popular YouTubers with a significant number of subscribers, Felix Kjellberg
(a.k.a. PewDiePie) often complains about record labels and production companies claiming
the advertising revenue of his gameplay videos (the length of which can extend up to a few
hours) for the use of a few seconds of a copyright protected song (that sometimes appear as
part  of the video-game  itself).  See  for  example:  PewDiePie.  (2017)  Life  is  cringe –  life  is
strange – S2E01. [online video] Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX4zk0
G4IjM [Accessed 10 January 2019].
32 Article 5 (3) (i)  states  that  Member  States  may  provide  for  exceptions  or limitations
to the rights of reproduction and communication to the public for the incidental inclusion
of a work or other subject-matter in other material. This provision creates a legal basis for
the introduction of de minimis limitations in EU countries’ national laws. In the USA, trivial,
or de minimis use is often allowed by courts. It means that the unauthorized use in question
is  so small  and irrelevant  that  it  would weigh  against  the finding  of infringement  both
regarding  the substantiality  of the portion  taken  and  the possible  effect  of the use
on the potential market of the protected work (the third and fourth factors described above
in footnote  2.).  This  doctrine  has  been  developed  by case  law,  mostly  in relation
to background objects appearing in movies. See:  Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television,
Inc. (1997) 126 F.3d70, 16 September; Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp. (1998) 147 F.3d 215,
24 June; Newton v. Diamond (2004) 388 F.3d 1189, 7 April.
33 Friedman,  B.  and  Nissenbaum,  H.  (1996)  Bias  in Computer  Systems.  ACM  Transactions
on Information Systems, 14 (3), pp. 332–333.
34 Op. cit., p. 334.
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of the judiciary  or of the legislator,  in instances  when  it  is  outsourced
to private  companies,  the public  scrutiny  that  courts,  judges  and
parliaments are otherwise subject to can be easily evaded by these entities.35
4. A NEW GENERATION IN ALGORITHMIC 
ENFORCEMENT?
As artificial  intelligence  and  machine  learning36 is  gradually  spreading
across the world, algorithmic copyright enforcement seems to be an obvious
field  of application.  One  of the essential  tools  and  technological
manifestations of machine learning is text and data mining, which covers
the process of gathering and analysing vast amounts of information in order
to be  able  to forecast  certain  trends  and patterns.37 For  autonomous  and
semi-autonomous systems, the supply  of infinite amount of user-generated
content38 provides  an invaluable  pool  of diverse  and  unfiltered  training
data, which ensures their effective and accurate functioning. Text and data
mining  is  generally  used  to extract  and  classify  data  from  large  sets
of information.  Based  on the KDD-process39 (Knowledge  Discovery
in Databases),  it  includes  the selection,  pre-processing,  transformation,
the actual  mining  and  finally,  the evaluation  or interpretation  of data.
Machine  learning  algorithms,  on the other  hand,  use  these  clean  and
targeted datasets and the trends and patterns drawn from them as training
data  to learn  to predict  future  occurrences  as well  as to carry  out  certain
tasks  in a supervised  or unsupervised  fashion.40 As these  algorithms
generally work better  and produce the most accurate results  if they have
35 Citron, D. K. (2008) Technological Due Process.  Washington University Law Review, 85 (6),
p. 1298.
36 Although these two terms are used interchangeably in the context of this article, machine
learning  and  artificial  intelligence  are  not  exactly  the same.  Artificial  intelligence  is
the broader concept, while machine learning is the manifestation of the study and learning
processes that could be applied in artificial intelligence solutions. See: Ryszard S. Michalski,
Jaime  G.  Carbonell  and  Tom  M.  Mitchell  (eds.).  (1983)  Machine  Learning:  An Artificial
Intelligence Approach. 1st ed. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, p. 3.
37 Witten,  I.  H.  and  Frank,  E.  (2005)  Data  Mining,  Practical  Machine  Learning  Tools  and
Techniques. 2nd ed. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, p. 23.
38 According to some sources, there are 400 hours worth of videos uploaded to YouTube every
minute  and approximately  95  million  pictures  shared  on Instagram  daily.  See  at:  DMR.
(2019) 160 YouTube Statistics and Facts. [online] Available from: https://expandedramblings.
com/index.php/youtube-statistics/  [Accessed  11  January  2019]  and  Omnicore.  (2019)
Instagram  by the Numbers:  Stats,  Demographics  & Fun  Facts. [online]  Available  from:
https://www.omnicoreagency.com/instagram-statistics/ [Accessed 11 January 2019].
39 Fayyad,  U.,  Piatetsky-Shapiro,  G.  and Smyth,  P.  (1996)  The KDD Process for  Extracting
Useful Knowledge from Volumes of Data. Communications of the ACM, 39 (11), pp. 30–31.
40 Murphy,  K.  P.  (2012)  Machine  Learning:  A Probabilistic  Perspective.  1st  ed.  Cambridge:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, p. 2.
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as much  and  as diverse  data  as possible  at their  disposal,41 the content
managed by these platforms seems ideal for the implementation of machine
learning technologies, especially in the field of enforcement.
Considering the issues of algorithmic enforcement discussed above, AI’s
and machine learning’s main contribution towards algorithmic copyright
enforcement  could  be  their  potential  to spot  and  differentiate  clearly
infringing  use  from  fair  use  with  the help  of their  more  sophisticated
technology than those of TPM and the hashing and search algorithms that
are  currently  employed.42 Even  more  so  considering  that,  based
on YouTube’s statement,  their  content  recognition  tools  do  not  determine
copyright  exceptions  or fair  use.43 However,  in order  to make  these
algorithmic  systems  more  balanced  in their  functioning,  the checks  and
limitations of the exclusive rights embodied in the exceptions and fair use
should be part of their design.44 Through an adequate flagging and training
system,  in which  the initial  enhanced  human  supervision  embodied
in marking  and  flagging  infringing  and  non-infringing  content  could  be
later  substituted  by the algorithm’s  own  assessment  facilitated  by high-
-quality  and  streamlined  datasets,45 the algorithm  could  be  taught
to identify  cases  of fair  use  or instances  of copyright  exceptions.  Even
though  the different  legal  systems  and  jurisdictions  regulate  copyright
exceptions differently,46 the problem translated into code is rather uniform.
For  instance,  there  are  several  exceptions  that  necessitate  the evaluation
of the  creator’s  intent  and purpose  as well  as the context  of the utterance:
the relevant  question  is  whether  the work  was  used  in relation  to social
commentary, a parody, teaching illustration or for quotation. AI is already
getting  better  at understanding  the intent  of the writer  or speaker  and
the context  of the specific  text  through  natural  language  processing.47
Additionally,  it  is  known  that  YouTube actually  uses  machine  learning
41 See  e.g.  Halevy,  A.,  Norvig,  P.  and  Pereira,  F.  (2009)  The Unreasonable  Effectiveness
of Data. Intelligent Systems, IEEE, 24 (2); Banko, M. and Brill, E. (2001) Scaling to Very Very
Large  Corpora  for  Natural  Language  Disambiguation.  In:  Bonnie  Lynn  Webber  (ed.).
Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting on Association for Computational Linguistics, Toulouse,
6–11 July. USA: Association for Computational Linguistics, pp. 26–33.
42 Elkin-Koren, N. (2017) Fair Use by Design. UCLA Law Review, 64 (5), p. 1097.
43 See:  Google.  (2019)  Frequently  asked  questions  about  fair  use.  [online]  Available  from:
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6396261?hl=en [Accessed 15 June 2019].
44 Elkin-Koren, N. (2017) Op. cit., p. 1085.
45 Lester, T. and Pachamanova, D. (2017) The Dilemma of False Positives: Making Content ID
Algorithms more Conducive  to Fostering Innovative  Fair  Use in Music  Creation.  UCLA
Entertainment Law Review, 24 (1), p. 69.
46 See footnote 3.
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in order to distinguish and eliminate  extremist  content  from its  platform,
and,  according  to the company,  the algorithm  seems  to function  quite
well.48, 49 Based  on these  assertions,  it  is  not  irrational  to imagine  that
the different  AI  and  machine  learning  applications  could  be  combined
together to deal with more complex expressions and issues, such as audio-
-visual content and copyright exceptions.
Nevertheless,  even though the issue relating to fair use and exceptions
could  be  potentially  addressed  by AI,  the other  problems  already
mentioned in relation to algorithmic copyright enforcement have the ability
to be  magnified  through  the employment  of these  novel  technologies.
Transparency of the decision-making process and the arguments behind its
reasoning would essentially disappear: some forms of autonomous systems
generate  their  own  code,  while  deep  learning  applications  and  neural
networks  function  effectively  as “black  boxes”  due  to their  immense
complexity, the lack of human intervention as well as the inability to reverse
engineer  the processes  and  the reasons  behind  the machine’s  actions.50
As learning  algorithms  do  not  only  implement  the goals  of the creator
of the code  but  have  the capacity  to modify  the meaning  of the goals
47 There  has  been  recent  developments  both  regarding  sentiment  analysis  and  sarcasm
detection  through  deep  learning.  See:  Sarikaya,  R.,  Geoffrey  E.  and  Deoras,  A.  (2014)
Application  of Deep  Belief  Networks  for  Natural  Language  Understanding.  IEEE
Transactions on Audio, Speech and Language Processing, 22 (4) and Zhang, M., Zhang, Y. and
Fu, G. (2016) Tweet Sarcasm Detection Using Deep Neural Network. In: Eiichiro Sumita,
Takenobu  Tokunaga  and  Sadao  Kurohashi  (eds.).  Proceedings  of COLING  2016,  the 26th
International  Conference  on Computational  Linguistics:  Technical  Papers, Osaka,  Japan,  11–16
December. Japan: Japanese Association of Natural Language Processing, pp. 2457–2458.
48 YouTube. (2017) An update on our commitment to fight violent extremist content online. [online]
Available from: https://youtube.googleblog.com/2017/10/an-update-on-our-commitment-to-
fight.html [Accessed 13 January 2019]. Based on Google’s recent transparency report, almost
90,000 videos were removed between January and March 2019 due to being of violently
extremist  nature:  Google.  (2019)  Featured  policies. [online]  Available  from:
https://transparencyreport.google.com/youtube-policy/featured-policies/violent-extremism
[Accessed 14 June 2019].
49 Although YouTube claims that automatization is key in removing content before it could go
viral,  a Counter  Extremism  Project’s  report  on ISIS  content  on YouTube found  that  24 %
of the examined 1,348 videos remained online for  more than two hours,  garnering close
to 150,000 views, while 91 % of the extremist videos were later reuploaded. These data are
however not completely indicative of the effectiveness of the machine learning algorithms,
given that  YouTube  employs human review and hashing as well, while automatization is
mainly used to locate extremist videos. Counter Extremism Project. (2018)  The eGlyph Web
Crawler:  ISIS  Content  on YouTube. [online]  Available  from:  https://www.counter
extremism.com/sites/default/files/eGLYPH_web_crawler_white_paper_July_2018.pdf
[Accessed 14 June 2019].
50 For further information on this issue, see: Knight, W. (2017) The Dark Secret at the Heart
of AI.  MIT Technology Review, 11 April.  [online] Available  from: https://www.technology
review.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ [Accessed 13 January 2019].
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themselves,51 it  would  be  close  to impossible  to tell  if the machine  made
justified  decisions  and  used  the right  criteria  for  assessing  fair  use.
Similarly,  accountability  could  present  a new  challenge,  as the question
of how  AI  could  explain  its  decisions  also  touches  on the issue  of legal
personality  of artificial  intelligence  and  how  and  to whom  liability  for
damages  and  wrongdoings  could  and  should  be  assessed.52 Finally,
the algorithm-driven pre-adjudication process could lead to biased decision
making: even though the formal and public court proceedings would still
be available for aggrieved parties, the trust put in algorithmic enforcement
and  automation  bias53 would  discourage  people  from  turning
to the traditional  judiciary  when they feel  that  their  rights  as users  have
been violated by the application of automated enforcement measures, due
to humans’ tendency to ignore or not search for contradictory information,
if a decision  is  generated  by a sophisticated  computer  and believed to be
correct.54 This  could affirm that  any sort of bias  embedded in the process
would remain in the system, unchallenged.
5. THE DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL 
SINGLE MARKET AND ITS ARTICLE 17
These  concerns  as well  as the whole  idea  of automated  algorithmic
copyright enforcement have become even more relevant recently in Europe,
in the context of the EU’s recent copyright reform.
The most  important  part  of the copyright  reform  package  of 2016,
the directive  on copyright  in the digital  single  market55 (DSM  Directive)
envisions  to modernize  European  copyright  rules  to meet  the challenges
51 Perel,  M.  and  Elkin-Koren,  N.  (2017)  Black  Box  Tinkering:  Beyond  Disclosure
in Algorithmic Enforcement. Florida Law Review, 69 (1), p. 189.
52 For  the extensive  literature  on the issue  of legal  personality  implications  of artificial
intelligence see:  Solum, L.  B.  (1991)  Legal  Personhood for  Artificial  Intelligences.  North
Carolina  Law Review, 70 (4);  Čerka,  P.,  Grigienė,  J.  and Sirbikytė,  G.  (2017)  Is  it  possible
to grant legal personality to artificial intelligence systems? Computer Law & Security Review,
33 (5); Allgrove, B. (2004) Legal Personality for Artificial Intellects: Pragmatic Solution or Science
Fiction? [online] Available  from:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=926015  [Accessed  15  January
2019].
53 Bamberger, K. A. (2010) Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age.
Texas Law Review, 88 (4), p. 676.
54 Cummings,  M.  L.  (2006)  Automation  and  Accountability  in Decision  Support  System
Interface Design. The Journal of Technology Studies, 32, p. 25.
55 Directive  (EU)  2019/790  of the European  Parliament  and of the Council  of 17  April  2019
on copyright  and  related  rights  in the Digital  Single  Market  and  amending  Directives
96/9/EC  and  2001/29/EC.  Official  Journal  of the European  Union  (2019/L-130/92)  17  May.
Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2019.130
.01.0092.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2019:130:TOC [Accessed 15 June 2019].
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of the digital  world  as well  as to ensure  the proper  functioning
of the internal market by stimulating innovation, creativity and investment
in new  content.56 One  of the most  debated  and  controversial  provisions,
Article  17  aims  to regulate  the status  and  liability  of certain  online
platforms.  The provision’s  goal  is  to clarify  and  uniformize  the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law and declare online content
sharing  service  providers  that  store  and  handle  a significant  amount
of copyright protected work to be primary users of the content when they
give  the public  access  to these  works  or other  protected  subject  matter
uploaded by their actual end users.57 This rule would mainly concern social
media  and  content  sharing  sites,  such  as YouTube,  Facebook  or Instagram,
while  not-for-profit  encyclopaedias,  cloud  services,  educational  and
scientific  repositories,  open-source  software  developing  platforms  and
online marketplaces fall outside the scope of the definition of “online content
sharing service provider”. As primary users of copyright protected works, it
will  be necessary for these platforms to obtain licenses, pay licensing fees
and to bear the burden of primary liability for copyright infringement. If no
such license  or authorization is  granted, then platforms will  be liable  for
the unauthorized  acts  of communication  to the public,  including  making
available  to the public,  of the copyright-protected  works,  unless  they
demonstrate that they made their best efforts to obtain an authorization and
to ensure the unavailability of specific works (for which the right holder has
provided the necessary information),  and in any case, acted expeditiously
upon  the receipt  of a notice  to block  or remove  those  specific  works.58
Nevertheless,  the measures  to comply  with  this  obligations  need  to be
proportionate  to the type,  audience,  size  of the service  and  the type
of the works uploaded,  as well  as the availability  of suitable  and effective
means.59 If there  is  an authorization  acquired,  it  will  also  have  to cover
the acts of the users, when they are not acting on a commercial basis or their
activities  do  not  generate  a significant  amount  of revenues.60 Regarding
the tools  to ensure  the unavailability  of unlicensed  material,  the earlier
versions  of the proposal  even  made  an explicit  reference  to content
56 Op. cit., Recital (2).
57 Op. cit., Article 17 paragraph (1).
58 Op. cit., Article 17 paragraph (4).
59 Op. cit., Article 17 paragraph (5).
60 Op. cit., Article 17 paragraph (2).
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recognition technologies.61 The European Parliament’s  approved report that
constituted  a basis  for  the informal  trilogue  negotiations  was  even  more
rigorous  in this  regard,  as it  did  not  even  provide  for  an exemption
as described above, thus placing the burden of strict liability for copyright
infringement on the platforms concerned.62
Even though such measures are currently used by some online platforms
voluntarily (as we have seen earlier through the example of YouTube), these
sites  could  have  still  qualified  as intermediaries  in most  cases  based
on the Ecommerce Directive. As such, they could also have benefited from
the harmonized safe harbour provisions63 shielding them from secondary
liability.64 However, if these platforms are to be considered primary users
(meaning that they are going to be regarded as performing the copyright-
-relevant act of communication to the public themselves as well when their
end-users upload a piece  of content),  the utilisation of content  recognition
technologies would essentially become obligatory for them to avoid liability
for infringement. This creates a strong incentive for these platforms to over
filter  and  block  any  suspicious  and  possibly  infringing  content,
in the absence  of a relevant  authorization.  In order  to achieve  the best
results,  platforms  would  also  be  interested  in using  the state  of the art
technology for the application of these preventive measures, which points
in the direction  of the employment  of machine  learning  and  artificial
intelligence-based technologies.
Nevertheless, in case these technologies are going to be a ubiquitous part
of online content creation and consumption, potential solutions and ways
61 Article 13  paragraph (1),  European  Commission.  (2016)  Proposal  for  a Directive
of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  on copyright  in the Digital  Single  Market.
(COM(2016)  593  final)  14  September.  Available  from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0593 [Accessed 15 January 2019].
62 The so-called  “Voss-report”  (named  after  the rapporteur)  was  supported  by a significant
majority of MEPs at the plenary session of the European Parliament on 12 September. See:
European Parliament.  (2018)  Report  on the proposal  for  a directive  of the European Parliament
and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market. (COM(2016)0593 – C8-0383(2016) –
2016/0280(COD)). Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.dopubRef=
%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BREPORT%2BA8-2018-0245%2B0%2BDOC%2BXM%2BV0%2F
%2FEN&language=EN [Accessed 7 February 2019].
63 Currently  secondary  liability  and its  requirements  are  not  harmonized on the European
level,  however,  Articles  12–14.  of the Ecommerce Directive  do provide for  a harmonized
liability  exemption  scheme.  See:  Nordemann,  J.  B.  (2017)  Liability  of Online  Service
Providers for  Copyrighted  Content – Regulatory Action Needed?  In-Depth Analysis  for
the IMCO Committee. Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A (Economic
and Scientific Policy), European Parliament, p. 19. 
64 The proposal  even  makes  an explicit  reference  to the inapplicability  of the Ecommerce
Directive’s  safe  harbour  rules  to online  content  sharing  platforms  that  perform
a communication to the public. European Commission. (2016) Op. cit., Article 13 para. (3).
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to mitigate the drawbacks of the currently employed enforcement systems
and  the future  issues  of machine  learning-based  technology  outlined
in the previous sections need to be considered.
6. TEXT AND DATA MINING AND ITS POTENTIAL 
IMPACT ON ALGORITHMIC ENFORCEMENT
Although there is a number of potential tools for such harm-reduction (such
as the setting of certain standards of disclosure to ensure transparency and
accountability65 or an effective complaint and redress mechanism to tackle
the problems of biased pre-adjudication and to provide human oversight),
this  chapter  focuses  on another  provision  within  the DSM  Directive,
the exception on text and data mining and how it could alleviate the issues
associated with algorithmic enforcement.
The essence  of text  and  data  mining  can  be  captured  through  its
definition,  which  denotes  the extraction  of implicit,  previously  unknown,
and potentially useful information from data, for which machine learning
provides  the technical  basis.66 A study  commissioned  by the European
Commission  put text and data mining in the wider context of data analysis,
which is the automated processing of digital materials, which may include
texts,  data,  sounds,  images  or other  elements,  or a combination  of these,
in order to uncover new knowledge or insights.67 Text and data mining is
essential in realizing the full potential offered by the accumulation of huge
amounts  of data,  and  it  is  utilized  in many  different  fields,  such
as commerce, finance, or marketing.68 Additionally, text and data mining is
becoming  a useful  tool  in scientific  and  academic  research69 and  based
on the potential uses of machine learning outlined in the previous chapter,
it  could play  an important  role  in the development  of more  sophisticated
enforcement algorithms, which could differentiate between infringing and
65 Lester, T. and Pachamanova, D. (2017) Op. cit., p. 70; Perel, M. and Elkin-Koren, N. (2016)
Op. cit., pp. 529–530.
66 Witten, I. H. and Frank, E. (2005) Op. cit., p. xxiii.
67 Triaille,  J.  P.,  de Meeus  d’Argenteuil,  J.  and  de Francquen,  A.  (2014)  Study  on the legal
framework  of text  and  data  mining  (TDM). [online]  Luxembourg:  European  Union.  p. 17.
Available from: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/074ddf78-
01e9-4a1d-9895-65290705e2a5/language-en [Accessed 4 February 2019].
68 Big Data Made Simple. (2014)  Top 14 useful applications of data mining. [online] 20 August.
Available from: https://bigdata-madesimple.com/14-useful-applications-of-data-mining/
[Accessed 4 February 2019].
69 Filippov, S. (2014) Mapping Text and Data Mining in Academic and Research Communities
in Europe. The Lisbon Council Special Briefing Issue, (16), p. 11.
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non-infringing  uses  to a better  extent.  Text  and  data  mining  is  closely
related  to machine  learning,  as,  in general,  knowledge  extracted  from
examples of a task through data mining can allow for a better performance
of the task,  while  learning  process  itself  generates  more  knowledge
in the form of data.70
As it has been stated earlier, one way to make these algorithms effective
is  to provide  them with  as much  and  as diverse  information  as possible.
However,  copyright  law  itself  can  constitute  an obstacle  in this  process.
The process  of text  and  data  mining  includes  the  following  stages:
the business understanding of the problem, the data-specific understanding
of the same  problem  and  task,  the preparation  of data  for  analysis
(the selection  of relevant  data  and  the creation  of the final  dataset),
the modelling  (the actual  mining,  which  includes  the choice  of the proper
method  and  its  implementation),  the evaluation  of the prepared  models,
and  finally,  the application  of the findings.71 Text  and  data  mining
performed for  machine  learning purposes  thus could potentially  include
copyright-relevant  acts  of copying,  transforming,  or communicating
to the public  while  carrying  out  the steps  above.  This  means  that
the analysis  of data  found  within  material  that  is  protected  by copyright
or another  right  (such  as the database  right72)  could  necessitate  the prior
authorization of and additional payment to the right holders. This could be
especially true in the case of platforms like YouTube, where the vast majority
of videos are under copyright law’s protection.
Large  platforms,  such  as YouTube  or Facebook  operate  with  terms
of service that already provide them with authorization to perform text and
data  mining  on copyright-protected  contents  uploaded  to their  servers
70 Calders, T. and Custers, B (2013) What Is Data Mining and How Does It Work? In: Bart
Custers  et al.  (eds.).  Discrinimation  and  Privacy  in the Information  Society. 1st  ed.  Berlin:
Springer, p. 29.
71 Based on the Cross-industry Standard Process for Data Mining (CRISP-DM). Vorhies, W.
(2016)  CRISP-DM – a Standard Methodology to Ensure a Good Outcome.  [online] Data Science
Central.  Available  from:  https://www.datasciencecentral.com/profiles/blogs/crisp-dm-a-
standard-methodology-to-ensure-a-good-outcome [Accessed 4 February 2019].
72 The  database  right  is  enshrined  in Directive  96/9/EC  of the European  parliament  and
of the Council  of 11  March  1996  on the legal  protection  of databases.  It  differentiates
between databases protected by copyright law as the own intellectual creation of the author
by reason  of the selection  or arrangement  of their  content  and  databases  that  merit
protection due to the fact  that  the maker of the database has made a qualitatively and/or
quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation
of the contents of the database.  This latter  is  called  the sui  generis database right.  Makers
of sui  generis databases  have  the right  to prevent  the extraction  and/or  re-utilization
of the whole or of a substantial part of the database.
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through  the all-encompassing  global  licenses.73 Other  actors,  such
as research or non-profit  organizations,  however, do not have this luxury
of access and they lack one of the most important means to develop their
own versions  of ID algorithms:  a minable  database  of considerable  size.74
This  situation  gives  large  tech-corporations  a competitive  advantage and
essentially  a monopoly  on algorithmic  copyright  enforcement.  We  have
seen earlier the problems that algorithmic pre-adjudication such as content
filtering by private can pose, as these entities often have their own interests
and  agenda,  which  might  be  contrary  to the interests  of users  as well
as the freedom of expression.
A potential  way  to attenuate  these  consequences  could  be  to remove
the obstacle  that  copyright  and other  rights  constitute.  Although certain
countries75 already have provisions  on a copyright  exception for  text  and
data mining already in force, there has been no such exception on the EU-
-level yet. However, a provision in the DSM Directive envisions to remedy
this defect: among the rules on new, mandatory exceptions, Article 3 makes
it  compulsory  for  member  states  to introduce  a copyright  exception
providing cultural heritage and research institutions the ability to freely use
protected works for text and data mining for scientific research purposes.
Another,  originally  optional  provision  that  turned  into  a mandatory
exception  through  the course  of the negotiations  (Article  4)  additionally
prescribes  to member  states  to introduce  a general  and  broad  TDM-
-exception which  would  apply  regardless  of the nature  of the beneficiary
institutions  or the purpose  of the activity.  This  exception  would  provide
an opportunity for other entities to more easily develop alternative methods
and algorithms, as they would be free from the burden of authorization and
remuneration-payment. In both cases, text and data mining could be carried
out  freely  on works  and  databases  to which  they  have  lawful  access  to.
73 See: YouTube. (2019)  Terms of Service, Section 8: Rights you license.  [online]  Available from:
https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms [Accessed 7 February 2019] and Facebook.
(2019)  Terms  of Service,  Section  3.3:  The permissions  you  give  us. [online] Available  from:
https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [Accessed 7 February 2019].
74 Although  there  are  a number  of public  datasets  that  could  be  used  freely  for  machine
learning  purposes,  they  usually  do  not  contain  information  related  to the consumption
of copyright-protected  content  or copyright  exceptions.  For  some  lists  of datasets  see:
Stanford, S. (2018)  The Best Public  Datasets for Machine Learning and Data Science. [online]
Available  from:  https://medium.com/towards-artificial-intelligence/the-50-best-public-
datasets-for-machine-learning-d80e9f030279 [Accessed 15 June 2019] or DeGroat, T. J. (2018)
19 Free Public Data Sets for Your Data Science Project.  [online] Available  from: https://www.
springboard.com/blog/free-public-data-sets-data-science-project/ [Accessed 15 June 2019].
75 These countries include the UK, Ireland, Germany and Japan. See: Triaille, J. P., de Meeus
d’Argenteuil, J. and de Francquen, A. (2014) Op. cit.
380 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 13:2
As a further limitation, right holders could expressly reserve the use of their
works and protected subject-matter, thus retaining control over excluding
TDM. 
In any  case,  the exception  on text  and  data  mining  could  create
competition  that  could  cater  for  a more  fair  and transparent  algorithmic
enforcement.  The possibility  to be  able  to analyse  and  train  semi-
-autonomous and  autonomous  systems  is  essential  for  the effective
development of copyright enforcement algorithms.  By ensuring that more
and better data could be freely processed, the environment would be more
adequate  for  the development  of fair  algorithms.  If more  non-profit  and
research organizations  could create their  own enforcement algorithms,  it
would not only ensure a more balanced competition through the possibility
of choice  for  emerging  platforms,  but  the aforementioned  issues,  such
as transparency and bias could also be mitigated: if there are more actors,
especially  not-for-profit  organizations,  then  trade  secrecy  becomes  less
of an issue  and  with  a higher  level  of transparency  the possibility
of clandestine bias could be prevented as well. Nevertheless, the exception
only  concerns  the actual  acts  of text  and  data  mining,  while
the development  of new  algorithms  is  outside  of its  scope.  However,
the potential  to license  or sell  the enforcement  algorithms  that  have  been
based on the results  of TDM carried out  under the exception could either
compel larger tech companies to take the development of their own content
recognition  tools  seriously,  or could  create  an alternative  market  and
an incentive to outsource the creation of such algorithms to other entities.
7. CONCLUSION
Copyright law has gone through a number of significant changes in the past
years,  as it  continuously  struggled  to keep  abreast  of technological
development  and  to maintain  its  original  goal  as well  as the level
of protection  to right  holders.  As enforcement  of copyright  has  become
more difficult with the proliferation of new technologies in the production
and  dissemination  of copyright-protected  works,  the need  for  solutions
employing  technology  appeared  as well.  Although  cutting  edge,  new
technology  manifested  in artificial  intelligence  and  machine  learning
provide new possibilities for algorithmic copyright enforcement, they also
present  and potentially  aggravate  issues  such  as the lack  of transparency
and  accountability,  bias  and  the limitation  of basic  rights  such
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as the freedom  of expression  and  information.  These  problems  require
specific attention with the DSM Directive entering into force: as Article 17
regards  online  content  sharing  service  providers  to be  carrying  out
the copyright  relevant  act  of communication  to the public,  these  service
providers could be exempt from infringement for copyright liability only
if they  demonstrate  that  they  have  made  their  best  efforts  to ensure
the unavailability of unauthorized works on their platforms. This situation
could  easily  prompt  service  providers  to use  the best  and most  effective
tools.
The issues  that  could  potentially  emanate  from the employment  of AI
and machine learning-based algorithmic enforcement mechanisms could be
attenuated  by two  other  provisions  of the DSM  Directive:  the mandatory
exceptions  on text  and  data  mining.  Even though the original  legislative
intent  behind  the TDM-exception  was  to secure  the development  of data
science  and  to close  the gap  that  has  appeared  between  the scientific
community of Europe and other jurisdictions with more lenient copyright
regimes (such as the United States, where the fair use doctrine offers a more
flexible  approach  towards  text  and  data  mining,  or China,  where
enforcement  of intellectual  property  rights  is  still  not  in  par  with
the European system), it seems to have a secondary, unintentional positive
impact  on algorithmic  enforcement.  It  also  serves  as an example  of how
the different  rules  and  the different  sides  of the same  issue  could  be
balanced out within the same legal instrument. Similarly, it is a reminder,
that regulation and legislation concerning technology or other fields highly
influenced  by technology  merit  thorough  preliminary  analysis.  Reactive
law-making  where  only  the existing  problems  are  addressed  with  little
to no  consideration  to the future  direction  of technological  development
and  its  possible  implications  should  be  avoided  as it  has  the potential
to result in an already obsolete and defunct regulation from the time of its
entering  into  effect.  This  way,  the potential  benefits  of AI  and  machine
learning  to copyright  law  could  prospectively  be  overshadowed
by the disadvantages  and  various  issues  brought  about  by these  new
technological phenomena.
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